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Abstract
Several scholars of populism have pointed out that populist parties rely very oft en on so-called 
charismatic leadership (Canovan, 1981; McDonnell, 2015). While the rise of populist parties in 
Europe in the last decade is quite evident and well-studied, what remains understudied is how this 
phenomenon interacts with other transformations that are currently shaping parties and party 
systems in European democracies. In particular, what is the interplay between the rise of pop-
ulism, political leadership and personalization of politics? Th is link between populism and leader-
ship could be understood in the light of the change occurring within party organizations, and in-
ternal party democratization in particular (Musella, 2015; Pogunkte and Webb, 2007; Karvonen, 
2010; Scarrow et al. 2017). Following these studies underlining a close relationship between pop-
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ulism, leadership and inclusive leadership selection methods, in this paper we aim at empirically 
exploring how the personalization and democratization of organizational patterns aff ect the role 
of the leader in populist parties. To what extent does the use of inclusive selection methods of par-
ty leaders within populist parties aff ect the scope of their organizational power and strengthens 
the party’s personalization patterns? To explore this research question, we focus on a case study, 
the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy as an empirical illustration and we rely on original survey data, on 
aggregated electoral data as well as on primary and secondary data on party organizational rules.
Keywords: populism, party politics; primary elections; party leaders, intra-party democracy
Introduction
Th e literature on populism is rather vast and heterogeneous (e.g. Taggart, 2004; 2000; 
1995; Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015; 2007; 
Mény and Surel, 2001). Yet, despite this large and prolifi c interest on populism, a shared 
defi nition is still missing. Is it an ideology? Or could it be understood as a communication 
style, or rather as a strategy? (Aalberg et al., 2015; Moffi  tt, 2014; Stanley, 2008; Jagers and 
Walgrave, 2007; Canovan, 2002). Although the literature debate is still unclear about the 
very nature of populism, when going through studies on this topic some common traits 
do emerge about the essential features of populism. All the defi nitions point to the fact 
that populism is structured on the contrast between the people, intended as a homogene-
ous entity, and the elites (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). 
According to populist view, the people are deprived of rights, powers and opportunities 
by political, economic, fi nancial or intellectual elites which conspire in order to preserve 
their privileges. Th is Manichaean distinction underpins the very idea of populism regard-
less of any ideological distinction (Mudde, 2004).
Another trait seems recurrent among populist movements and parties. According to 
most scholars, populist parties rely very oft en on so-called charismatic leadership (Cano-
van, 1981). McDonnell (2015) argues, in this regard, that for understanding the dynamics 
underlying the charisma of populist leadership it is necessary to take into consideration 
the relationship with their followers. Th e extraordinary qualities of the leader are recog-
nized and put at the service of a mission, which defends the people against the elites. Th e 
bond with the supporters is built upon an emotional emphasis on this seminal task, and 
the authority of the leader is never challenged. Populist leaders adopt a direct and ‘popu-
lar’ communication style and strategy, exalting the proximity of the leader to the ‘people’ 
(De Lange and Art, 2011). Th e leader appears as the embodiment of the people’s will on 
the basis of a direct and unmediated relationship with the citizens (Zaslove, 2008; Hawk-
ing, 2003). In this sense, social media has off ered a fertile ground for the development and 
affi  rmation of populism. Th at is why the mediation role of journalism is not recognized by 
populists: traditional media are blamed for being part of the criticized elites. Th e leaders 
allow a direct and horizontal relationship with supporters, making the populists claims 
even more eff ective: they come from a leader that is close to ‘the people’ (Gerbaudo, 2018; 
Postill, 2018; Engesser et al., 2017).
Th is links between populism and leadership could be understood in the light of the 
transformations occurring within party organizations (Musella, 2015; Pogunkte and 
Webb, 2007; Karvonen, 2010). Within political parties characterized by weaker and more 
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fl exible organizations, political leaders have become a crucial resource; they act as a cog-
nitive shortcut for mobilizing support. Th e fading of ideologies has revealed the weakness 
of political parties, whose organizational structures are not focused anymore on political 
socialization and mobilization of supporters (Garzia, 2011). Th e leaders become the bond 
between citizens and parties, and this linkage is fed by a sense of loyalty not transferable 
to the party. Th is strong and personal connection led scholars to interpret as a risk for 
the party organization some of the inclusive procedures implemented for selecting party 
leaders (Katz and Mair, 1994). Open and closed primaries, in particular, have been seen 
as a viaticum for further strengthening party leaders. Indeed, off ering a say to larger se-
lectorates for candidates or leaders’ selection indeed could lead to the development of 
plebiscitary dynamics, endangering the party structure. Being selected by an inclusive se-
lectorate, in fact, implies that leaders have a direct legitimization that does not come from 
the organization, and this aff ects their responsive attitude towards the party. In other 
words, through primary elections party leaders may disengage from the control of party 
middle-level structures.
Following these studies underlining a close relationship between populism, leadership 
and inclusive selection methods, in this paper we aim at empirically exploring how per-
sonalization and democratization organizational patterns aff ect the role of the leader in 
populist parties. Our main research question is thus the following: to what extent does the 
use of inclusive selection methods of party leaders within populist parties aff ect the scope 
of their organizational power and strengthens the party’s personalization patterns? Or, in 
other words: to what extent do primaries strengthen the role of the leader in a populist 
party, both in terms of personalization and scope of power?
To do so, we use the case of the Lega Nord (LN) as an empirical illustration and to 
provide a descriptive account of our main research question. It off ers, indeed, a privileged 
perspective of analysis for our purposes. Th e Lega Nord represents the oldest party in Ita-
ly. Aft er having survived the so-called First Republic, it went through the Second Republic 
unscathed and proved an uncommon organizational adaptability and survival capacity. 
In 2012, the party experienced a serious organizational crisis that required a change of 
leader (Albertazzi, 2016; McDonnell, 2015; Diamanti, 1996). Closed primaries were or-
ganized in order to facilitate the succession and dismiss the charismatic leadership of the 
founding father Umberto Bossi. A larger selectorate provided legitimacy to the new ap-
pointed leader, Matteo Salvini, enabling him to fi nalize the ideological and organizational 
transition towards a new party where regionalist claims faded in order to engage on full 
populist traits. It represents, thus, a very interesting case for understanding the interac-
tion between populism, leadership and primaries.
In terms of methodology, while the approach chosen in this study is mostly exploratory 
and descriptive, we rely on three main sources of data: original survey data collected by 
the authors in 2013, aggregated electoral data presenting the result of LN primary elections 
by regional constituency, as well as primary and secondary data on party organizational 
rules (mostly from party internal regulations and press articles). For further information 
about the survey data used in this paper, please see footnote no.3. 
Th e next section will off er an overview of the case study; the third section will detail the 
relevant party internal rules and will present the leadership races that appointed Matteo 
Salvini as the head of the party. It will also present survey data about the party members’ 
feelings on the introduction of inclusive selection methods. Th e fourth section will pro-
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vide an analysis of the role, powers and duties of the party leader within the LN. Th e paper 
then presents some concluding remarks in the last section.
Th e case of the (Northern) League
As underlined by Musella and Webb (2015), Italy is an ideal case for the study of the per-
sonalization of politics. Th e centrality of political leaders and personalization of politics 
was indeed one of the main traits characterizing the so-called Second Republic (Musella, 
2015; Pasquino, 2014; Calise, 2010). Th is approach also off ers a paradigmatic perspective 
for scholarly analysis of populism. Th e processes of ‘personalization of politics’ emerging 
at the end of the 1990s were defi ned as a promised land for populism since they anticipat-
ed the phenomenon that is now aff ecting many democracies (Tarchi, 2015). Th e populism 
trait was present and vivid since the beginning of the Second Republic when the Tangen-
topoli scandals provided excellent fuel for the Manichean distinction between the people 
and the elites (the parties). Bossi and Berlusconi became paradigmatic examples of popu-
list leadership (McDonnell, 2016; 2006: Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015). 
Th e last general elections held in 2018 resulted in a spectacular failure of mainstream 
parties which was combined with an impressive result achieved by populist parties. Th e 
M5S was able to increase its consensus gaining more than the 30% of the votes, while the 
LN under the leadership of Matteo Salvini increased from the 4.7% in 2013 to more than 
17% in 2018 (Itanes, 2018). Th e two parties arranged a coalition government, even if with 
some diffi  culties. Th e government enjoyed a  rather long honeymoon period, and even 
though the coalition emerged weakened aft er the fi rst year in power, the LN has become 
the senior and most powerful partner of the coalition. 
Finally, Italy could be considered as a  laboratory concerning the implementation of 
inclusive procedures for selecting candidates and party leaders. Since 2005, when citizens, 
for the fi rst-time, were invited to have a say on the Prime Ministerial candidate for the 
center-left  coalition, primaries became a routine procedure for several parties (Venturino, 
2007). Moreover, since then, more the 1000 primaries have been held at national, regional 
and local level (Venturino, 2017). In particular, the birth of the Partito Democratico in 
2007 represented an offi  cial recognition of the value of primaries (Bordandini et al., 2008). 
Th e party, indeed, within its statute defi nes open primaries, allowing both members and 
sympathizers to participate in the internal ballot, as the main method for selecting can-
didates and the party leader (Venturino, 2015). For a long time, primaries seemed to be 
peculiar to the centre-left . It was even quite obvious, since the other parties were personal, 
so the nomination process was entirely managed by the party leader and there was no 
need (or sense) for promoting leadership races. Th ings changed with the entrance of the 
M5S within the political system. It promoted closed primaries, among registered party 
members, for selecting their candidates at national, regional and local levels (Lanzone and 
Rombi, 2014). At that point, the ownership of inclusive procedures simply disappeared 
for the left -wing area. Primaries were eventually something used transversally among all 
parties.
Th erefore, it was no surprise that eventually the LN decided to use closed primaries 
in order to solve the leadership and organizational crisis aff ecting the party aft er a scan-
dal concerning the misuse of public funds. It was the easiest and most eff ective tool for 
providing new legitimacy to a new generation of leghisti. While primaries are nowadays 
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widely used in political parties, not only populist ones, as a tool for internal democratiza-
tion, there seems to be an emerging interrelation between personalization, populism and 
primaries. From this point of view, considering the LN as a case study for exploring the 
impact of leadership selection modes and organizational setting on populist leaders seems 
particularly relevant.
Th e LN has been defi ned as a regional populist party as it combined, since its creation, 
regionalist demands with a populist trait (Biorcio, 1991). Th e harsh opinion of national 
elites, which were criticized for depriving the Northern regions in order to feed their elec-
toral strongholds in Southern Italy, was the cornerstone of the LN’s rhetoric (Albertazzi, 
2007). In addition, it fi ts in perfectly with the populist logic. Th e LN is a peculiar party, 
which demonstrated an unusual ability to react to external challenges. As a Janus-biface, 
the party has been and still is capable of serving in government while maintaining its 
populist and anti-elitist approach, even though it was precisely part of the elite ruling the 
country. Th e ambivalent nature of the party was supported, back in the 90s and 2000s, 
by the presence of a charismatic leader, Umberto Bossi, acting as a guarantor of the party 
strategies and actions (Albertazzi, 2016). Th e uncontested authority of its leadership al-
lowed the party to overcome several crises during the Second Republic. Th erefore, the end 
of Bossi’s leadership in 2012 due to a combination of health and judicial issues represented 
the most endangering challenge for the party survival (McDonnell, 2015).
Th e transition phase ruled by Roberto Maroni, who was acting as the interim leader, 
off ered a window of opportunity for a young generation of Leghisti demanding renewal 
within the party. But how to remove the founding father without overturning the party? 
Primaries were the answer. Th ey were not included within the party statute, yet they have 
been introduced for providing legitimacy to the new leader. Th e plebiscitary risk evocated 
by Katz and Mair (1994) fi nds empirical expression with the LN primaries in 2013. Matteo 
Salvini easily won the competition obtaining enough support for reshaping the party. Un-
der Salvini’s leadership the party changed both in organizational and ideological terms. 
A parallel organization named ‘Noi con Salvini’ was founded with the aim to expand the 
party’s presence in the South, and it was promoted as a direct expression of the new party 
leader. 
Whilst the old and northern party organization resisted and maintained its routine 
in mobilizing supporters and party members at local level, the new, fl exible organization 
in the South is still lacking territorial structures and thus uses social media as the main 
channel of mobilization (Diamanti, 2017). Th rough his Facebook page, Matteo Salvini 
sets and builds a strong connection with supporters (Bobba, 2015). Outside the Northern 
strongholds, the Lega Nord is basically a virtual organization: there is only the leader (Al-
bertazzi et al., 2018). 
Th e organizational re-designing of the party is combined with an ideological trans-
formation. Under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, the party weakened the emphasis on 
the regional demands in order to support nativist nationalism claims. Th e removal of the 
“Northern” adjective in the party’s name is actually something more than a  rhetorical 
strategy. Not by coincidence, the party logo for 2018 Italian general elections dismissed 
the word ‘Northern’ in order to make explicit reference to the leader. Th e Northern inter-
ests are left  aside to embrace a sovereigntist approach, typical of extreme-right populist 
parties. Th e party changed its face, and — at least apparently — its soul: it is the League 
(Lega) now, without the North (Nord).
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A deep transformation has taken place within the party, but it is not just a consequence 
of a renewal in leadership. Th e party has redefi ned its very organization, starting with the 
rules for selecting the new party leader. Th is paper aims precisely to clarify whether and 
to what extent the plebiscitary value of primary elections may have contributed to give 
legitimacy to the new leader, providing him the authority to implement further organiza-
tional changes.
Th e selection of a new leader: from Bossi to Salvini
As oft en happens with populist parties, its founding father Umberto Bossi led the North-
ern League seamlessly since its inception in 1989 until 2012, and no competition for the 
leadership was ever organized. From an electoral point of view, aft er countless ups and 
downs throughout its history, the Northern League won a remarkable 8.3 per cent in the 
2008 parliamentary election and entered as a junior partner in the right-wing coalition 
government led by Silvio Berlusconi. In the following years, the party gained further suc-
cesses in second-order — European and local — elections. However, in November 2011, the 
annus horribilis of the Northern League began. Th e Berlusconi government imploded and 
then proceeded to be replaced by the Monti cabinet, with the party relegated to opposi-
tion. Aft er few months Umberto Bossi, several members of his family and associates of 
his entourage came under investigation because of fraudulent activities regarding party 
fi nances. In April 2012, Bossi was forced to resign as party leader, and a temporary, col-
lective leadership formed by Roberto Maroni, Roberto Calderoli and Manuela Dal Lago 
was put in charge until the next congress. Th e latter took place in July, when Maroni was 
elected as the new party leader. During the Election Day on 24 February 2013, while the 
Northern League received a discouraging result in the parliamentary election, Maroni 
was chosen as the regional president of Lombardy. As Maroni had pledged to do, in Sep-
tember he left  the party leadership, meanwhile launching the race for the new leadership.
Unquestionably, the League’s party leader wielded an unbounded power, largely due 
to the predominance of informal practices on formal rules. However, the party statute 
imposed a three-year term and a leader selection by a delegates’ convention, a traditional 
solution in the Italian political landscape (Sandri et al. 2014). Approaching the 2013 leader 
selection, with an eff ective competition expected for the fi rst time, the method of choice 
had been entirely innovated with a derogation from what was set by the statute. Precisely, 
the selectorate was enlarged from convention delegates to party members, introducing the 
practice of closed primary elections within the party organizational structures for the fi rst 
time. Moreover, plurality was adopted as the internal ballot’s electoral system, and can-
didates were required to have been enrolled for at least 10 years and endorsed by at least 
1,000 members. It should be also noted that only a portion of party members were eligible 
to vote. Th e party statute in fact distinguishes between ‘supporter’ and ‘activist’ members, 
the latter being enrolled for no less than 12 months (McDonnell and Vampa 2016: 111). 
Only activists could endorse and vote for primaries’ candidates.
Th e 2013 leader selection was launched with urgency in the context of a crisis within 
the party; thus the changes in the rules were not implemented through a reform of the 
2012 statute. Rather, they have been ratifi ed with the guidelines for the 2013 congress1. It 
1 Cfr. Regolamento del Congresso Federale Straordinario del 15 Dicembre 2013, art. 9–10.
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is worth underlining that the 2015 and 2017 statutes were concise regarding leader selec-
tion, avoiding explicit references to the primaries. As a consequence, the rules for the 2017 
primaries were more detailed within the congress guidelines, which recognized the party 
convention having a fi nal say therefore adopting a mixed selectorate2. In any case, con-
sidering that the 2017 statute changed the name of the party in Lega per Salvini premier, 
it seems that informal practices still prevail on formal rules. Overall, the party leadership 
incumbent or endorsed candidate running -in the closed primaries is not subject to any 
eff ective competition from other potential candidates. If so, seen from this angle, the new 
League led by Salvini is very similar to Bossi’s old Northern League.
Table 1. Results of the 2013 and 2017 primaries for the Northern League leadership
2013 closed primaries 2017 closed primaries
Region Matteo Salvini Umberto Bossi Matteo Salvini Giovanni Fava
Valle d’Aosta 80 20 100 0
Piemonte 83 17 87 13
Liguria 91 9 95 5
Lombardia 79 21 78 22
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 72 28 75 25
Veneto 84 16 91 9
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia 90 10 87 13
Emilia-Romagna 66 34 67 33
Toscana 89 11 83 17
Marche 86 14 83 17
Umbria 67 33 95 5
Italy 81.7 18.3 82.7 17.3
N 8,162 1,833 6,636 1,388
Valid votes 9,995 8,024
Invalid votes 226 0
Turnout 10,221 8,024
Note: values are percentages.
Source: Northern League.
Th e new sets of rules have been so far used on two occasions, in 2013 and 2017, and 
in both cases two candidates contested the leadership (See Table 1). In the fi rst case Um-
berto Bossi, looking for a restoration of his previous role, was challenged by the younger 
Matteo Salvini, then a 40-year-old member of the European parliament. In the second 
race Salvini as the incumbent leader easily prevailed on the then current member of the 
Lombardy regional government and former MP, Giovanni Fava. Th e results of these two 
races, reported in Table 1, clearly show the recurrent lack of competition oft en associated 
with inclusive selectorates (Kenig 2008).
2  Cfr. Regolamento del Congresso Federale Ordinario del 21 maggio 2017, art. 10–13.
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While the mixed selectorate added in 2017 marked only a minor adjustment in com-
parison with the preexisting rules, the closed primaries adopted in 2013 signalled a re-
markable makeover of the party’s practices. Hence, the fi rst experience with primaries in 
2013 is the best case for studying the members’ reactions to the rules change.
Table 2. Th e attitudes about the primaries of the Northern League’s members, 2014
How much do you agree with the following statements?
Strongly 
Disagree, 
Disagree
Agree, 
Strongly 
Agree N
Primaries should be open to sympathizers, even if they are 
not formally enrolled 54 46 4,308
Primaries have improved my overall evaluation of the party 36 64 4,303
Primaries promote political turnover 24 76 4,355
Primaries enhance internal factionalism 65 35 4,299
Th e Northern League should organize coalition primaries 
for selecting the next Prime Minister candidate 25 75 4,244
Th e Northern League should use primaries for selecting 
candidates for parliamentary elections 19 81 4,299
Th e Northern League should use primaries for selecting 
candidates for local elections 24 76 4,244
Note: values are percentages.
Source: C&LS — Candidate and Leader Selection.
Table 2 reports the fi ndings of a survey of Northern League’s membership3. First of all, 
respondents are quite evenly divided about the use of closed versus open primaries, with 
a small prevalence of those advocating the former. Th e support for open primaries could 
perhaps be a consequence of their recurrent use by many Italian left -wing parties, which 
has transformed them into a familiar feature of Italian politics. More realistically, open 
primaries could be seen as a useful tool for promoting democratic ideals, such as partic-
ipation and political involvement, which are at the core of the rhetorical appeals of all 
parties. Instead, most respondents are strongly skewed in support of primaries because of 
the improvement they guarantee to bring to the party image and the supposed potential 
3 Data has been collected through a web-based survey, accomplished by sending by email the pro-
posal to the interviewees to fi ll in a questionnaire uploaded on line. Th e web-based survey of the LN’s 
enrolled members was conducted immediately aft er the party organized a  closed primary election for 
selecting the party leader in December 2013. Th e questionnaire was sent electronically by the party central 
offi  ce to a sample constituted of all LN members who provided their email address upon their enrolment. 
Overall, 5,129 questionnaires were collected from 10 February to 10 March 2014. Unfortunately, since the 
survey was managed directly by the party central offi  ces on the basis of a very strict overseeing procedure, 
we are not able to estimate the response rate. Nevertheless, according to the LN website, in 2013 the LN 
declared an enrolment total of 12,000 members. Th us, we can estimate that our responses generate a po-
pulation frame coverage of 42.8%. However, given that the central offi  ces of the party drew the sample and 
refused to divulge the sample size, we cannot estimate the response rate.
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for elites’ renewal. Th ey are also confi dent that primaries contribute to solving problems 
rather than fueling internal confl icts. Finally, party members strongly advocate primaries 
for selecting candidates to all public offi  ces, either Prime Ministerial posts, or national 
representatives, or local government roles. Th is is intriguing information, since Northern 
League as a rule picks up all its candidates by making use of an extremely centralized and 
exclusive procedure.
Th e role of the party leader from Bossi to Salvini
Until the transition in 1993–1994 from the First to the Second Republic, almost all ‘First 
Republic’ Italian parties and the Lega too, assigned full power to party secretaries as the 
organizational leaders of the party. Moreover, in the last twenty years there has been 
a trend towards the concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of the leader 
of the party in parliament and/or in government. Th is has been particularly noticeable 
among right-wing parties (Venturino 2010, Massari 2015). For instance, during his tenure 
as party secretary of the LN (1989–2012), Umberto Bossi was unquestioned leader of the 
party well before he obtained ministerial posts, but still kept a tight rein on ministerial 
posts for federal reforms (2008–11). Under Bossi, the party leadership combined public 
offi  ce and party mandates and this somewhat blurred the distinction between the party in 
public offi  ce and the party in central offi  ce. However, under the new leadership of Salvini, 
the extra-parliamentary party organization and the PCO (party in central offi  ce) retain 
a crucial role within the new Lega, even during the period of Salvini’s participation in the 
Conte I government (June 2018-August 2019). Th us, the real diff erence between the lead-
ership of Bossi and of Salvini in terms of their situation within the party organization lies 
in the centrality of the extra-parliamentary party organization, which is stronger under 
Salvini’s rule and was weaker under Bossi’ leadership.
In order to highlight how the LN organizational settings diff ered from those of main-
stream parties, since the end of the 1980s Bossi favoured the term ‘federal secretary’ in 
order to call attention to the political goals of his party, acknowledging the (back then) 
regionalist features of the party. Also, the LN has, for decades, kept its ‘founding father’ 
as party leader4. Th e centrality of the LN leaders can be discerned in several aspects of 
the party’ internal life. In line with traditional patterns of Italian politics, the leaders of 
LN are not usually the parliamentary leaders of their respective parties. Regardless of 
this limitation, they — Bossi until 2012, Salvini since 2013- all enjoy unconditional me-
dia dominance, they are the party’s main asset in personally gathering electoral support, 
they wield tight control on the extremely centralized process of candidate selection, and, 
fi nally, they counter potential factionalism by forcing out any opponents. Th ey have cre-
ated a strictly controlled party whose main goal is the promotion of their own public and 
personal careers (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino 2014).
Still, the LN is based on a  long-standing organizational model that — to diff erent ex-
tents — goes back to the mass-party ideal-type. Even if Bossi and now Salvini are charis-
matic leaders exerting a tight reign over the party, the LN is well organized both at na-
tional and local levels, with a strong organizational penetration on the ground. Th is holds 
not only in the Northern regions, aka its ‘Padania’ strongholds, but also in central Italy 
4 Th e Statute recognizes formally Umberto Bossi as the founding father of the party, article 14.
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regions, albeit — as noted above — not in the South. Overall, the legitimacy of the leader is 
related to the body that selects him (only male leaders have been elected up to now). As 
explained above, the LN has chosen, since 2013, to hold internal ballots (closed primaries) 
to select its leader even if the party statutes still say otherwise (selection by delegate to 
party congress, article 15 of the 2015 & 2017 statutes). In practice, the size of selectorate 
bodies can vary. Only few thousand members of LN voted in the internal ballot in 2013 
(10,221) and 2017 (8,024).
Th e ‘ultimate principals’ of the LN leaders are their selectorates. Th is means that the 
‘ultimate principals’ of the LN leaders have changed signifi cantly since 2013, because the 
party has since 2013 held closed primary elections for selecting its leader. In practice the 
ultimate principals are now the members, even though the party internal regulations were 
changed only in 2017 to accommodate the new leadership selection method. Th is means 
that a relevant organizational change has recently aff ected the role of the party leader, be-
cause the legitimacy of the leader is related to the body that selects him and this body has 
changed. Th e leadership selectorate and its ‘ultimate principal’ was until 2013 the federal 
congress of the party, and now is the party membership. Th is means that if both leaders, 
Bossi and then Salvini, are legitimated by their selectorate, the adoption of closed prima-
ries made a substantial diff erence in the way the party works, in the way leaders exert their 
power and are legitimized by the base. Th e relevance of the charisma of the leader has now 
therefore waned, because his power is now legitimated by the broad body that selected 
him and gave him his mandate. 
However, if rules for selecting new leaders are formally enshrined in the party’s consti-
tutions, they are not always strictly followed. At least formally, the length of the LN leader 
tenure is 3 years and there are no term limits detailed in the statutes (in terms of number 
of consecutive mandates). 
In terms of requisites for candidacy, seniority, as a condition to be eligible as a leader-
ship candidate, has never been incorporated into the LN internal rules. Th e Lega’s most 
recent statutes require that prospective candidates should be party members, but the LN 
has never formally set an age limit for its leader, and the same goes for gender alternation. 
In terms of rules governing candidacy, the LN statutes do not require that their prospec-
tive candidates possess some kind of formal endorsement in order to participate in the 
leadership race. As for deselection rules, no removal procedure is provided for by the 
party statutes of the new Lega. Th e same goes for the 1989–2012 LN organizational form.
Th is relative stability in terms of organizational settings (still based on the model of the 
mass party) has resulted in an increasingly central role for the leader, both in terms of du-
ties and powers, on the one hand, and in terms of control over the party in central offi  ce. 
Th e analysis we present below shows that the powers of the leader have increased with the 
2015 party statute change. Th is seems to suggest that the change of leadership from Bossi 
to Salvini was accompanied by a change in the way the leadership power is exerted within 
the party, in particular in the sense of an even greater centralization of powers in the hand 
of the extra-parliamentary party leader.
Salvini’s successful strategy of renovating a personal party has brought about a radical 
mutation of the LN programs and political positions, constituting a rare case in which 
a personalistic party remains strong beyond a change in its leadership ( Vercesi, 2015).
More specifi cally, in the LN new statutes, it is the party executive (federal council) that 
decides if and when leadership selections can be held and pre-selects the aspiring candi-
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dates that can run in the internal elections. Th e internal ballot was run by the party con-
gress, according to the previous version of the statute, and in the new version of the party 
convention rules, by membership vote since the 2017 selection (article 13 of the party 
statute and LN 2017 congress guidelines, art. 10–13). Th e federal council is composed of 
30 members representing the PCO (party in central offi  ce) at national and provincial lev-
els, plus some representatives of the PPO (party in public offi  ce) but without voting rights. 
Th erefore, the authority of the agent that decides whether or not to call for a new leader-
ship selection is quite concentrated. Also, most of the members of the federal council are 
appointed by the leader himself and Salvini has managed to establish his rule within the 
dominant coalition in the party and had already silenced internal opposition during his 
fi rst mandate. His re-election was set to be a coronation, and the challenger was allowed to 
run mainly to increase the legitimacy of the mandate of the winning candidate by avoid-
ing such a hollow internal election. Even before Salvini’s reign, the scope of powers of the 
party leader was quite broad, and he could exert extensive patronage over party’s internal 
mandates. Moreover, the leader-controlled federal council is also responsible for defi ning 
the detailed rules for candidacy in leadership internal ballots and exerts a tight control 
over the formation of electoral lists for local, regional, national and European elections 
(articles 12 &13 of the 2015 statutes).
Th e types of control that can be exerted by other party bodies over the leader, once he is 
in offi  ce, are quite weak in the LN, since several internal organs are directly appointed by 
the leader, namely the deputy leader and the secretary-general (administrative secretary). 
Th e leader, though, appoints the LN executive committee members. However, 13 of them 
are chosen by the party congress (art. 15 of LN 2015 statutes). In both parties, the leader 
of the parliamentary group (whose mandate is distinct from that of the party leader) is 
appointed by the PPO itself. Nevertheless, of course the party leader oft en has a big say 
in who is chosen by the group. Similarly, the LN policy spokesperson is usually selected 
by the party central offi  ce. Th e same goes for the party organ responsible for proposing 
changes to party rules, and both bodes are kept tightly under the control of the leader.
In addition, who are the members that select the LN leader? What is their role in this 
leader-centred organization? In terms of age criteria, the LN requires its prospective 
members to be legal adults endowed with voting rights, and that they do not belong to 
other parties or political movements. Th e two other conditions (probationary period or 
sponsorship by other current party members) are also part of the complex conditions to 
be satisfi ed in order to become a LN member. In fact, the central organs of LN attentively 
investigate each admission application through three diff erent levels of evaluation and 
require not only that a prospective member does not belong to other parties or to associa-
tions not approved by the party, but also that they endure a probationary period. In terms 
of procedure, the LN recruits individual members via their local branches. However, the 
LN sometimes provides the opportunity to register as a member at another level (such as 
the level or regional branches).
In highly stratarchical, personal parties such as the LN, the organizational reach of the 
party is quite broad because membership is conceived mainly as an instrument of elec-
toral mobilization and party organizational unity is guaranteed by the fact that followers 
gather around a charismatic, all-powerful leader. Th e LN permits diff erent types of party 
membership by recognizing within its internal statutes also the category of ‘party sup-
porter/sympathizer’. Th is is the case also in several other Italian parties, but in the case of 
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LN this category represents simply the fi rst step in the complex procedure of becoming 
a member. Previous literature has shown that the LN is composed of highly polarized 
factions and this means that the threat of internal confl icts or even splits has led the par-
ty elites to be reluctant to enlarge membership boundaries or give members too exten-
sive rights (Biorcio 2017; McDonnell and Vampa, 2016). Th e stratarchical organizational 
structures of the LN and its charismatic leaders and personalized internal organization 
result in an unequal distribution between rights and obligations for grass-roots members: 
it is quite complex to become a member and once enrolled the instances for having a say 
within the party are relatively limited. Th e LN statutes contain detailed rules for identify-
ing the grounds upon which members can be expelled (articles 34–36). In this party, it is 
not easy to become a member, but it is even more diffi  cult to remain so. Internal loyalty is 
considered generally as fundamental because members’ rights are signifi cantly less exten-
sive than obligations and the internal decision power is tightly held in the hands of party 
elites (Sandri, Seddone and Bulli 2015).
Concerning members’ rights and obligations, the LN membership privileges include, for 
instance, the right to take part in crucial intra-party activities and internal decision-mak-
ing such as participating in social events, selecting the party leader and the delegates to 
the party congress. Th e party does not provide the possibility for its members to directly 
participate in the selection of party central executive bodies. Th e members are not en-
dowed with the right to directly participate in the formulation of the electoral manifesto 
or other policy positions. However, the members of LN can exercise an indirect infl uence 
in this aspect of intra-party decision-making by sending delegates to the congress, which 
is responsible for adopting the electoral programme. As mentioned above, in the LN, it is 
generally the party in central offi  ce that selects candidates and decides the composition 
of the lists.
We can thus see from this discussion of the scope of power of the party leader and of the 
role of the party grassroots that, while members still maintain a crucial function within 
the party and the LN features a strongly decentralized mass-like mode of political organ-
ization, the leader has increasingly concentrated the intra-party power into his hands. 
Except for the all membership ballots now formally organized to select the leader, which 
oft en are merely coronations (McDonnell and Vampa 2016).
Conclusions
2013 was a dramatic year for the Northern League. In February the party took part in the 
parliamentary election under the provisional leadership of Roberto Maroni, gaining an 
appalling 4 percent of the votes and 35 MPs elected in the two houses. In December, as 
reported above, Matteo Salvini was elected as the new party leader using, for the fi rst time, 
the OMOV (One Member One Vote) method. Since then, the party experienced a striking 
organizational change and obtained remarkable results in second- and fi rst-order elec-
tions. Th e 2018 parliamentary election marked a turning point in Italian political history. 
Th en, the League campaigned for the fi rst time throughout the whole national territory, 
reaching an astonishing 17 per cent of the votes. As no party or coalition was able to obtain 
a parliamentary majority, the League broke the right-wing coalition to form a government 
together with the Five Star Movement. Th is is the fi rst case in Europe of a cabinet utterly 
supported by populist — although diff erent from several points of view — parties. And in 
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just a few months the League overcame its governmental partner in the polls, leaping to 
an unprecedented 37 percent approval rating from the interviewed voters.
Progressing from the Bossi to the Salvini leadership, the transformations undertaken 
by the League have been impressive. Moreover, these transformations are strongly con-
nected with the image of Salvini as party leader, and they have been built upon a change 
in the method used to select the party leader.
Th e adoption of closed primaries in 2013 signifi cantly aff ected the party’s internal prac-
tices. In particular, the use of membership ballots to select the leader, which oft en are 
merely coronations, have strengthened even further the stratarchical, personal party or-
ganizational features of the new Lega and handed over even more powers to the leader. If 
the organizational settings and the role of the leaders within the Lega’s structures have not 
fundamentally changed from Bossi to Salvini, the new Lega under Salvini’s rule and aft er 
the 2015 internal regulations change has witnessed a substantial reinforcement of the per-
sonalization and power centralization patterns already present in the Lega. Th is has been 
brought about mostly by the use of primaries, which have changed the locus of legitimacy 
of the leader, which now lies in the hand of the members rather than of the middle-level 
elites and central party bodies.
As our original survey data clearly showed, the NL members’ and activists strongly 
support the use of internal ballots to select the party leader and strongly advocate the use 
of primaries for selecting candidates to all public offi  ces at all levels. Th is means that not 
only is the leader more broadly legitimated when chosen by a full membership vote, but 
also that he or she could benefi t from a party base which is highly mobilisable, supportive, 
and strongly satisfi ed with the party’s internal functioning. When these views and support 
from the grassroots are analyzed together with the consequences in the change of rules on 
the party internal power distribution, it appears evident that the adoption of primaries for 
selecting the leader since 2013 has signifi cantly broadened the scope of power of the leader 
and strengthened his/her tight control over the party organizational apparatuses.
Following our preliminary empirical exploration, several questions arise: to what ex-
tent have the changes in the leader selection mode contributed in boosting the party for-
tune? To what extent has the inclusiveness of the closed primaries been a relevant factor 
for explaining the extraordinary rise of the League? Th e answers to these questions re-
quire further research. However, based on our explorative and descriptive analysis of the 
changes in the LN leadership, the relevance or organizational setting such as the leader’s 
selection methods must be nuanced. By and large, while the leader’s image has been — and 
continues to be — infl uential, the role of the leader selection mode seems to be negligible. 
Interesting insights on the League’s actual success could come rather from the adoption 
of a comparative perspective. Th roughout the European democracies, mainstream — and 
especially left -wing — parties are actually involved in a deep crisis, probably due to a long-
term loss of importance of the basic issues endorsed by social-democrats since their incep-
tion. Th is paves the way for the breakthrough of new parties, with the radical right family 
being, in this moment, the most rampant.
A long-standing stream of research focusing on populist parties focuses on their ability 
to adapt and endure, especially once they have entered in government. In the Italian case, 
the simultaneous access to government of two diff erent populist parties makes this point 
particularly intriguing. It is diffi  cult to anticipate whether they are prone to a rapid failure 
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aft er an initial success, or they are here to stay. Whatever happens, the problem of party 
leadership, and leader selection, will continue to be central.
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